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Abstract:	  
The	  sharp	  rise	  in	  household	  finance,	  both	  in	  debt	  and	  in	  assets,	  is	  one	  of	  the	  striking	  empirical	  facts	  about	  the	  
US	  economy	  of	  the	  last	  two	  decades.	  But	  it	  is	  still	  not	  clear	  what	  caused	  it.	  Economists,	  both	  mainstream	  and	  
heterodox,	  seek	  an	  explanation	  in	  financial	  market	  innovation	  and	  liberalization.	  But	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  find	  
systematic	  evidence	  for	  this	  link.	  Our	  paper	  takes	  up	  another	  line	  of	  inquiry.	  Political	  economists	  have	  started	  
to	  ask	  how	  the	  restructuring	  of	  the	  welfare	  state	  may	  have	  affected	  household	  finance.	  We	  use	  SVAR	  analysis	  
to	  establish	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  link	  between	  the	  retrenchment	  of	  public	  social	  spending	  and	  the	  expansion	  of	  
tax-­‐incentivised	  private	  social	  spending,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  household	  finance	  variables	  on	  the	  other.	  More	  
specifically,	  we	  ask	  whether	  the	  transformation	  of	  the	  US	  welfare	  state	  over	  the	  last	  30	  years	  has	  affected	  
household	  finances	  through	  the	  channel	  of	  debt,	  leverage,	  or	  asset	  formation.	  Our	  findings	  suggest	  that	  the	  
asset	  channel	  is	  empirically	  the	  most	  likely	  candidate	  and	  we	  point	  to	  some	  welfare	  state	  reforms	  that	  can	  
support	  the	  operation	  of	  this	  channel	  since	  the	  mid-­‐1990s.	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I.	  	  Introduction	  
The	  sharp	  rise	  in	  household	  finance,	  both	  in	  debt	  and	  in	  assets,	  is	  one	  of	  the	  striking	  empirical	  facts	  
of	  the	  last	  two	  decades.	  There	  were	  a	  number	  of	  economists	  who	  studied	  this,	  notably	  in	  the	  context	  
of	  behavioural	  finance	  (Campbell	  2006)	  or	  in	  the	  heterodox	  ‘financialization’	  literature	  that	  takes	  off	  
from	  Hyman	  Minsky’s	  work	  on	  the	  inherent	  instability	  of	  capitalism.	  The	  financial	  crisis	  has	  given	  this	  
line	  of	  research	  great	  impetus.2	  These	  economists	  became	  aware	  that	  their	  models	  with	  financial	  
frictions,	  with	  sophisticated	  and	  naïve	  investors	  could	  explain	  partial	  market	  failure	  but	  not	  a	  
systemic	  crisis	  with	  serious	  macroeconomic	  consequences.3	  The	  term	  ‘financialization’,	  which	  is	  used	  
to	  denote	  the	  increasing	  dependence	  of	  the	  economy	  on	  financial	  transactions,	  has	  made	  it	  into	  the	  
mainstream	  vocabulary	  and	  heterodox	  economists	  have	  published	  an	  Oxford	  Handbook	  around	  it	  
(Wolfson	  and	  Epstein	  2013).	  Databases	  on	  household	  wealth	  and	  debt	  are	  now	  created,	  for	  instance	  
by	  the	  European	  Central	  Bank	  (ECB	  2013)	  and	  the	  World	  Bank	  (Beck	  et	  al	  2010).	  This	  economic	  
literature	  tries	  to	  find	  the	  explanation	  for	  household	  leverage	  cycles	  in	  financial	  innovation	  and	  to	  
evaluate	  their	  effect	  on	  the	  business	  cycle	  and	  on	  macroeconomic	  stability.	  
Another	  track	  starts	  from	  noting	  that	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  we	  could	  observe	  the	  rise	  in	  household	  
finance,	  there	  was	  also	  a	  sustained	  attempt	  at	  ‘ending	  welfare	  as	  we	  know	  it’	  under	  way.	  Paul	  
Pierson	  (1994)	  started	  the	  new	  politics	  of	  welfare	  literature	  that	  was	  based	  on	  the	  premise	  that	  the	  
retrenchment	  of	  the	  welfare	  state	  follows	  a	  different	  logic	  than	  the	  previous	  expansion.	  For	  a	  start,	  
it	  may	  be	  much	  more	  hidden,	  substituting	  visible	  transfers	  for	  tax	  expenditures	  that	  benefit	  different	  
households	  (Howard	  1997,	  Hacker	  2002).	  Welfare	  economists	  began	  to	  take	  the	  theory	  of	  market	  
imperfections	  seriously	  and	  questioned	  a	  pervasive	  equity-­‐efficiency	  tradeoff,	  given	  that	  social	  policy	  
interventions	  may	  help	  to	  mend	  insurance	  market	  failures	  (Barr	  1992).	  Along	  those	  lines,	  political	  
economists	  and	  social	  policy	  researchers	  have	  recently	  gone	  beyond	  the	  study	  of	  the	  privatisation	  of	  
old	  age	  security.	  They	  ask	  how	  partial	  welfare	  state	  retrenchment,	  eg	  in	  social	  housing,	  and	  the	  
expansion	  of	  the	  hidden	  welfare	  state	  through	  tax	  expenditures	  may	  have	  contributed	  to	  the	  
expansion	  of	  homeownership	  and	  personal	  pensions	  but	  also	  to	  the	  rise	  in	  mortgage	  debt	  (Ansell	  
2014,	  Schelkle	  2012,	  Schwartz	  and	  Seabrooke	  2009).	  
Our	  paper	  addresses	  alternative	  explanations	  that	  arise	  in	  these	  two	  thematically	  related	  but	  largely	  
separated	  strands	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  household	  finances:	  to	  what	  extent	  was	  this	  household	  
financial	  crisis	  caused	  by	  failing	  markets	  and	  underregulated	  banks,	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  by	  ill-­‐
conceived	  policies,	  notably	  of	  privatising	  social	  safety	  nets?	  We	  simultaneously	  use	  the	  timing	  of	  
financial	  liberalization,	  hidden	  welfare	  state	  retrenchment	  and	  financial	  innovation	  to	  find	  an	  
answer.	  Our	  approach	  is	  to	  apply	  a	  structural	  vector	  autoregression	  (SVAR)	  analysis	  that	  can	  
establish	  structural	  relations	  and	  causality	  even	  when	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  write	  a	  fully	  specified	  
model.	  It	  can	  also	  be	  used	  to	  narrow	  down	  the	  timing	  of	  a	  structural	  change	  in	  a	  relationship	  
between,	  in	  our	  case,	  social	  spending	  and	  indicators	  of	  household	  finances.	  For	  reasons	  of	  data	  
availability,	  we	  can	  undertake	  this	  research	  only	  for	  the	  United	  States	  although	  we	  have	  tested	  the	  
approach	  with	  one	  household	  finance	  variable	  on	  a	  comparative	  OECD	  dataset	  (Gerba	  and	  Schelkle	  
2013).	  	  	  	  	  	  
Our	  paper	  is	  structured	  as	  follows:	  in	  the	  next	  section,	  we	  prepare	  the	  ground	  for	  our	  SVAR	  analysis	  
by	  showing	  that	  financial	  liberalization	  cannot	  fully	  account	  for	  the	  rise	  in	  household	  finance.	  Since	  
we	  conclude	  that	  the	  timing	  allows	  at	  best	  a	  ‘necessary	  but	  not	  sufficient’	  role	  for	  liberalization,	  in	  
section	  III	  we	  try	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  retrenchment	  of	  public	  social	  spending	  and	  the	  
expansion	  of	  private	  social	  spending	  can	  be	  held	  responsible	  for	  households	  increasing	  indebtedness	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and/	  or	  increasing	  investment	  in	  private	  social	  security.	  Section	  IV	  relates	  our	  findings	  from	  the	  SVAR	  
analysis	  to	  specific	  reforms	  of	  the	  US	  tax-­‐transfer	  system	  in	  the	  1990s.	  Section	  V	  concludes.	  
	  
II.	  	  What	  role	  for	  financial	  liberalization	  in	  the	  rise	  in	  household	  finance?	  
The	  spectacular	  increase	  in	  household	  debt	  reflected	  a	  wider	  rise	  in	  household	  finances.	  After	  all,	  
households	  typically	  acquired	  homes	  or	  corporate	  shares	  with	  their	  credit.	  The	  following	  graph	  
shows	  just	  how	  spectacular	  this	  rise	  was.	  	  	  	  
Graph	  1:	  Evolution	  of	  key	  household	  finance	  variables	  as	  share	  of	  GDP	  between	  1980-­‐2010.	  
	  
Note:	  The	  vertical	  axis	  represents	  (household	  and	  corporate)	  balance	  sheet	  variables	  as	  percentage	  of	  nominal	  GDP.	  The	  variables	  we	  use	  
are	  Home	  mortgages	  of	  households	  (HMLBSHNO),	  Real	  Estate	  Assets	  at	  Market	  Value	  (REABSHNO),	  Household	  debt	  (HNOTOLQ027S),	  
Assets	  of	  corporates	  (NCBTSTQ027S),	  and	  Corporate	  loans	  (NCBLILQ027S)	  from	  the	  Federal	  Reserves	  St.	  Louis	  Database.	  Data	  on	  Equities	  
Held	  by	  Household	  (ew:usa12000169)	  is	  downloaded	  from	  Reuter’s	  EcoWin.	  	  
While	  real	  estate	  assets	  as	  a	  share	  of	  GDP	  increased	  more	  than	  threefold	  between	  1980	  and	  2007,	  
both	  household	  debt-­‐side	  variables	  increased	  by	  a	  factor	  of	  5	  during	  the	  same	  period.	  The	  same	  is	  
true	  for	  (corporate)	  equities	  held	  by	  households.	  Taking	  into	  account	  that	  real	  GDP	  grew	  by	  134%	  
during	  the	  same	  period,	  this	  is	  a	  remarkable	  rise	  in	  household	  balance	  sheets.	  Note	  also	  that	  while	  
equities	  held	  by	  households	  experienced	  a	  temporary	  setback	  following	  the	  dot.com	  bust	  in	  
2000/01,	  the	  other	  household	  balance	  sheet	  variables	  continued	  to	  rise.	  Finally,	  the	  growth	  and	  level	  
of	  household	  balance	  sheet	  was	  much	  higher	  than	  in	  the	  corporate	  balance	  sheet.	  Taking	  into	  
account	  that	  we	  report	  total	  assets	  of	  corporates,	  while	  we	  split	  household	  assets	  into	  multiple	  
categories,	  the	  level	  of	  total	  household	  assets	  (adding	  the	  various	  categories	  up)	  was	  higher	  than	  the	  
counterpart	  in	  the	  corporate	  sector	  from	  late-­‐1980’s	  onward.	  The	  difference	  in	  the	  two	  asset	  levels	  
peaked	  around	  mid-­‐2000.	  	  
But	  what	  exactly	  caused	  this	  take-­‐off	  in	  household	  finance?	  Financial	  economists,	  mainstream	  and	  
heterodox,	  tend	  to	  look	  for	  financial	  innovations	  and	  market	  liberalization	  to	  explain	  it.	  Financial	  
economists	  would	  point	  to	  the	  innovations	  that	  gave	  wider	  sections	  of	  households’	  access	  to	  credit	  
and	  made	  the	  risks	  involved	  more	  bearable	  for	  the	  lender	  at	  the	  same	  time	  (eg	  Dynan	  et	  al	  2006).	  
The	  financialization	  literature	  sees	  this	  increased	  access	  to	  credit	  as	  less	  beneficial,	  leading	  ‘from	  
financial	  exclusion	  to	  exploitative	  financial	  inclusion’	  (Kotz	  2013:	  418).	  What	  are	  the	  specific	  reforms	  
that	  these	  scholars	  could	  point	  to,	  from	  their	  very	  different	  perspectives?	  	  	  
The	  first	  major	  financial	  reform	  that	  had	  consequences	  for	  household	  finances	  was	  the	  so-­‐called	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of	  financial	  repression	  was	  phased	  out	  between	  1979	  and	  1986.	  It	  was	  followed	  by	  the	  Tax	  Reform	  
Act	  of	  1986	  when	  all	  interest-­‐related	  personal	  deductions	  were	  removed	  except	  for	  mortgages	  and	  
home	  equity	  loans	  (Gilbert	  1986).	  While	  these	  policy	  changes	  could	  explain	  a	  rise	  in	  household	  
balance	  sheet	  variables,	  simple	  visual	  inspection	  of	  graph	  1	  suggests	  that	  the	  take-­‐off	  took	  place	  
later.	  Moreover,	  the	  phasing	  out	  of	  Regulation	  Q	  should	  have	  led	  to	  increasing	  savings	  off-­‐setting	  
the	  tax	  subsidies	  for	  real	  estate	  borrowing.	  	  
The	  second	  wave	  of	  financial	  reforms	  during	  the	  1980’s	  concerned	  the	  market	  structure	  in	  the	  
financial	  industry.	  	  Commercial	  banks	  were	  increasingly	  allowed	  to	  enter	  new	  areas	  of	  business.	  The	  
(de-­‐)regulation	  initiatives	  that	  had	  most	  profound	  impact	  on	  the	  industry	  structure	  was	  the	  Riegele-­‐
Neal-­‐Interstate-­‐Banking	  and	  Branching	  Efficiency	  Act	  of	  1994	  (FDIC,	  1997).	  The	  bill	  eliminated	  
previous	  restrictions	  on	  interstate	  banking	  and	  branching,	  which	  ultimately	  lead	  to	  both	  a	  greater	  
consolidation	  and	  concentration	  of	  credit	  providers	  in	  the	  US.	  Between	  1990	  and	  1998,	  the	  number	  
of	  banking	  institutions	  decreased	  by	  27	  percent	  as	  banks	  continued	  to	  merge.	  The	  final	  demolition	  of	  
Glass-­‐Steagall	  came	  in	  1999	  when	  the	  Congress	  passed	  the	  Gramm-­‐Leach-­‐Bliley	  Act	  (or	  the	  Financial	  
Modernization	  Act),	  which	  repealed	  all	  restrictions	  against	  the	  combination	  of	  banking,	  securities	  
and	  insurance	  operations	  for	  financial	  intermediaries	  (Sherman,	  2009).	  	  
These	  regulatory	  changes	  can	  certainly	  explain	  why	  there	  was	  such	  an	  increase	  in	  liquidity	  and	  
complexity	  in	  the	  financial	  industry.	  But	  they	  cannot	  account	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  household	  finances	  
experienced	  such	  growth	  around	  mid-­‐to-­‐late	  90’s,	  and	  that	  this	  increase	  exceeded	  that	  of	  the	  
corporate	  sector	  balance	  sheet	  (see	  graph	  1	  and	  Gerba	  2014).	  If	  changes	  in	  the	  regulation	  of	  the	  
financial	  industry	  are	  a	  plausible	  explanation,	  than	  we	  should	  have	  seen	  very	  similar	  paths	  for	  
household	  and	  corporate	  balance	  sheets	  but	  the	  one	  for	  households	  rises	  much	  more	  steeply.	  
Financial	  innovation	  in	  mortgages,	  which	  account	  for	  70%	  of	  total	  household	  debt,	  is	  another	  
possibility.	  Interest-­‐only	  mortgages	  and	  option	  Adjustable-­‐Rate	  Mortgages	  (ARMs),	  for	  instance,	  
gave	  household	  more	  flexibility,	  and	  greater	  control	  over	  the	  amount	  they	  borrowed	  and	  refinanced.	  
Homeowners	  could	  postpone	  repayment	  of	  their	  principal	  almost	  indefinitely,	  or	  even	  choose	  
negative-­‐amortisation	  products	  that	  increased	  their	  principal	  over	  time.	  With	  the	  explosive	  rise	  of	  
house	  prices	  over	  time,	  home-­‐equity	  loans	  and	  lines	  of	  credit	  allowed	  households	  to	  draw	  liquidity	  
from	  what	  used	  to	  be	  equity	  tied	  up	  in	  their	  homes.	  The	  consequence	  was	  that	  the	  supply	  of	  
household	  borrowing	  increased,	  and	  consumers	  took	  greater	  responsibility	  for	  the	  design	  and	  
repayment	  of	  their	  debt	  (Ryan	  et	  al,	  2011).	  However,	  in	  a	  recent	  study	  on	  the	  reasons	  behind	  the	  
heavy	  built-­‐up	  of	  household	  debt	  prior	  to	  2007,	  Justiniano	  et	  al	  (2013)	  find	  that	  the	  observed	  
leveraging	  and	  deleveraging	  cycle	  cannot	  be	  simply	  explained	  by	  the	  liberalisation	  and	  subsequent	  
tightening	  of	  mortgage	  credit	  standards.	  Nor	  can	  changes	  in	  household	  preferences,	  interest	  rates,	  
or	  households’	  expected	  incomes	  (Dynan	  and	  Kohn,	  2007).	  Justiniano	  et	  al	  (2013)	  point	  instead	  to	  
factors	  that	  impacted	  house	  prices	  more	  directly	  as	  possible	  candidates.	  They	  do	  not	  answer	  the	  
question	  what	  these	  factors	  could	  have	  been.	  
We	  conclude	  that	  changes	  in	  financial	  innovation	  and	  deregulation	  cannot	  quite	  explain	  what	  we	  
saw	  in	  graph	  1.	  	  The	  financial	  liberalization/	  financialization	  strand	  of	  the	  literature	  leaves	  
underspecified	  when	  these	  changes	  led	  banks	  to	  discover	  household	  finances	  as	  a	  profitable	  source	  
of	  income	  and	  households	  in	  turn	  felt	  the	  need	  to	  take	  on	  more	  debt	  or	  became	  ready	  or	  to	  acquire	  
more	  assets	  relative	  to	  their	  income,	  depending	  on	  the	  theoretical	  perspective.	  	  
Political	  economists	  working	  on	  the	  restructuring	  of	  welfare	  states	  since	  the	  early	  1980s	  have	  
recently	  started	  to	  link	  their	  research	  with	  the	  transformation	  of	  household	  finances.4	  	  They	  reckon	  
that	  the	  retrenchment	  of	  public	  spending	  on	  households’	  safety	  nets	  has	  led	  households	  to	  seek	  
commercial	  substitutes	  while	  tax	  expenditures,	  such	  as	  tax	  subsidies	  for	  mortgages	  and	  pensions,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  A	  pioneering	  edited	  volume	  is	  Schwartz	  and	  Seabrooke	  (2009).	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directly	  incentivised	  private	  social	  spending.	  The	  OECD	  started	  to	  look	  into	  these	  two	  sources	  of	  
social	  spending	  some	  time	  ago	  (Adema	  et	  al	  2010)	  and	  confirmed	  that	  the	  United	  States	  has	  a	  vast	  
‘hidden	  welfare	  state’	  that	  qualitative	  research	  had	  discovered	  earlier	  (Hacker	  2002;	  Howard	  1997).	  
Private	  social	  spending	  refers	  to	  spending	  on	  purposes	  as	  defined	  in	  the	  OECD	  social	  expenditure	  
database,	  such	  as	  health	  and	  old-­‐age	  security.	  Combined	  with	  the	  public	  welfare	  state,	  this	  makes	  
the	  US	  one	  of	  the	  biggest	  spenders	  on	  social	  policy	  as	  a	  share	  of	  GDP.	  The	  following	  graph	  shows	  the	  
evolution	  of	  public	  and	  private	  spending	  on	  household	  safety	  nets	  in	  the	  US.	  
Graph	  2:	  Public	  and	  Private	  Social	  Spending	  as	  a	  share	  of	  GDP	  between	  1980-­‐2010.	  
	  
Note:	  The	  vertical	  axis	  represents	  social	  spending	  variables	  as	  percentage	  of	  GDP.	  The	  data	  was	  downloaded	  from	  the	  OECD	  Social	  Data.	  
Total	  welfare	  spending	  has	  increased	  from	  just-­‐under	  20	  percent	  of	  the	  GDP	  in	  1980	  to	  almost	  30	  
percent	  in	  2010.	  However,	  while	  the	  share	  of	  public	  social	  spending	  has	  risen	  only	  marginally	  from	  
under	  15%	  to	  over	  15%	  by	  2007,	  the	  share	  of	  private	  social	  spending	  has	  more	  than	  doubled	  during	  
this	  period,	  albeit	  from	  a	  lower	  level	  of	  under	  5%.	  It	  amounts	  now	  to	  40%	  of	  all	  social	  spending.	  Only	  
during	  the	  latest	  recession	  has	  the	  share	  of	  public	  spending	  increased	  significantly.	  	  
We	  explore	  the	  two	  possible	  explanations	  for	  what	  we	  observe	  in	  graph	  1	  but	  start	  with	  social	  
spending	  and	  take	  account	  of	  financial	  liberalization	  only	  indirectly.	  First	  of	  all,	  we	  try	  to	  locate	  a	  
structural	  change	  in	  the	  relationship	  of	  household	  finances	  to	  social	  spending	  that	  is	  hard	  to	  track	  by	  
visual	  inspection	  of	  graph	  2.	  This	  is	  to	  establish	  whether	  welfare	  state	  transformations	  that	  began	  in	  
the	  Reagan	  era	  are	  possible	  drivers	  of	  changes	  in	  household	  finances	  in	  the	  mid-­‐to-­‐late	  1990s.	  We	  
also	  explore	  whether	  the	  retrenchment	  of	  public	  social	  spending	  (that	  we	  observe	  throughout	  the	  
1990s	  in	  graph	  2)	  or	  the	  rise	  in	  private	  social	  spending	  have	  the	  expected	  sign:	  public	  spending	  
should	  have	  a	  negative	  relationship	  with	  variables	  of	  household	  finance	  as	  personal	  pensions	  and	  
real	  estate	  assets	  act	  as	  substitutes	  for	  state	  pensions	  (Kemeny	  1980,	  Castles	  1998).	  Private	  
spending,	  by	  contrast,	  should	  be	  positively	  related,	  stimulating	  directly	  the	  growth	  of	  household	  
finances.	  	  Finally,	  we	  try	  to	  identify	  the	  channels	  through	  which	  this	  is	  happening	  primarily:	  have	  
welfare	  state	  transformations	  pushed	  households	  into	  incurring	  more	  debt	  or,	  even	  worse,	  did	  they	  
push	  them	  into	  leveraging,	  ie	  incurring	  more	  debt	  based	  on	  rising	  values	  of	  their	  assets,	  notably	  
homes?	  A	  somewhat	  more	  benign	  possibility	  would	  be	  that	  the	  effect	  on	  asset	  formation	  was	  
stronger,	  leading	  only	  some	  households	  to	  incur	  more	  debt	  while	  others	  saved	  more?	  All	  of	  these	  
channels	  –	  debt,	  leverage,	  or	  asset	  –	  of	  social	  spending	  on	  household	  finances	  are	  in	  principle	  
compatible	  with	  what	  we	  observe	  in	  graph	  1.	  In	  order	  to	  answer	  these	  questions,	  we	  use	  an	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III.	  	  What	  is	  the	  relationship	  between	  social	  spending	  and	  household	  
finances?	  	  
Our	  empirical	  approach	  is	  to	  use	  SVAR	  analysis	  to	  determine	  which	  changes	  in	  welfare	  state	  
provisions	  can	  account	  for	  the	  transformation	  of	  household	  finances	  since	  the	  early	  days	  of	  financial	  
liberalisation	  in	  the	  1980s.	  To	  this	  end,	  we	  apply	  a	  standard	  unrestricted	  VAR(p)	  model:	  𝑦! = 𝜙! + Φ!𝑦!!!+. . .Φ!𝑦!!! + 𝜀!	  
where	  𝑦!	  is	  a	  vector	  of	  length	  K,	  p	  is	  the	  order	  of	  the	  VAR,	  𝜀!	  is	  a	  sequence	  of	  serially	  uncorrelated	  
random	  vectors	  with	  concurrent	  full	  rank	  covariance	  matrix	  Σ,	  	  𝜙!	  is	  a	  (Kx1)	  vector	  of	  constants,	  and	  Φ	  are	  (KxK)	  coefficient	  matrices.	  A	  recursive	  scheme	  is	  applied.5	  We	  run	  models	  with	  public	  and	  
private	  social	  spending	  as	  the	  starting	  variable	  pairwise:	  they	  have	  all	  household	  disposable	  income	  
as	  the	  intermediary	  variable	  but	  each	  pair	  differs	  as	  regards	  the	  specifications	  of	  household	  finance	  
variables	  (liabilities,	  assets,	  and	  both	  liabilities	  and	  assets).	  We	  order	  the	  social	  spending	  variables	  
first	  because	  we	  have	  shown	  in	  the	  previous	  section	  that	  household	  finance	  took	  off	  some	  time	  after	  
financial	  liberalization.	  Hence,	  we	  hypothesize	  that	  changes	  in	  the	  welfare	  state	  may	  have	  been	  a	  
factor	  that	  made	  households	  take	  recourse	  to	  commercial	  finance	  and	  banks	  respond	  to	  household	  
demand	  for	  credit	  and	  asset	  formation.	  However,	  there	  is	  flexibility	  in	  our	  econometric	  framework	  
that	  allows	  us	  to	  detect	  any	  (non-­‐contemporaneous	  or	  lagged)	  impact	  of	  household	  finances	  on	  
social	  welfare	  provision,	  in	  other	  words	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  converse	  relation	  which	  supports	  
the	  financial	  innovation/	  liberalization	  strand	  of	  the	  literature.	  
Corroborating	  evidence	  for	  the	  hypothetical	  influence	  of	  welfare	  state	  changes	  on	  household	  
finance	  could	  come	  from	  structural	  breaks	  in	  the	  relationship	  between	  social	  spending	  and	  financial	  
variables	  that	  coincide	  with	  significant	  welfare	  state	  reforms.	  We	  do	  indeed	  find	  such	  structural	  
breaks	  and	  they	  all	  cluster	  in	  only	  5	  years	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1990s.	  This	  is	  encouraging	  for	  our	  hypothesis	  
that	  welfare	  state	  changes	  contributed	  to	  the	  rise	  in	  household	  finance,	  but	  only	  the	  first	  step.	  	  
Then	  we	  go	  through	  the	  various	  models	  to	  establish	  whether	  any	  observable	  causation	  on	  
household	  finances	  works	  more	  strongly	  through	  public	  or	  private	  spending.	  The	  financialization	  
literature	  as	  well	  as	  comparative	  political	  economy	  studies	  of	  the	  welfare	  state	  hypothesize	  that	  the	  
withdrawal	  of	  public	  social	  spending	  may	  force	  households	  into	  private	  substitutes	  while	  the	  
increase	  in	  private	  social	  spending	  incentivizes	  the	  take-­‐up	  of	  commercial	  alternatives	  to	  welfare	  
state	  provisions.	  The	  two	  social	  spending	  variables	  should	  therefore	  have	  an	  opposite	  influence	  on	  
household	  finance	  variables,	  ie	  negative	  for	  public	  and	  positive	  for	  private	  spending.	  The	  strength	  
and	  direction	  of	  public	  and	  private	  social	  spending	  on	  household	  finances	  is	  also	  relevant	  for	  the	  
debate	  of	  how	  important	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  ‘hidden	  welfare	  state’	  (Howard	  1997,	  Hacker	  2002)	  is	  for	  
the	  ‘dismantling	  [of	  the]	  welfare	  state’	  (Pierson	  1994).	  If	  the	  substitution	  of	  public	  benefits	  for	  
private	  provisions	  is	  as	  important	  as	  in	  particular	  Hacker	  (2002)	  claims,	  we	  would	  expect	  at	  least	  as	  
strong	  an	  influence	  of	  the	  private	  social	  spending	  variable,	  mindful	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  its	  volume	  is	  
between	  one	  third	  and	  two	  thirds	  of	  public	  spending.	  
Another	  question	  that	  the	  literature	  review	  raised	  is	  whether	  changes	  in	  the	  welfare	  state	  have	  
driven	  households	  directly	  into	  debt	  or,	  even	  more	  concerning,	  have	  made	  households	  to	  ‘leverage	  
up’.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  leverage	  channel	  looks	  at	  how	  (public	  or	  private)	  social	  spending	  affects	  
household	  liabilities	  and	  through	  that	  real	  asset	  formation.	  An	  alternative	  is	  to	  hypothesize	  that	  
changes	  in	  the	  welfare	  state	  drove	  households	  to	  seek	  close	  private	  substitutes	  such	  as	  
homeownership	  for	  less	  secure	  old	  age	  security,	  a	  mechanism	  that	  works	  through	  asset	  formation	  
and	  underlies	  the	  endogenous	  preferences	  models	  of	  Schwartz	  (2012)	  and	  Ansell	  (2014).	  This	  would	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  For	  readers	  who	  are	  unfamiliar	  with	  the	  method,	  we	  refer	  to	  Sims	  (2002)	  or	  Christiano	  (2012)	  for	  a	  nice	  introduction	  and	  




tell	  us	  how	  immediate	  the	  responsibility	  of	  welfare	  state	  transformations	  is	  for	  the	  private	  debt	  
debacle	  that	  unfolded	  in	  2007-­‐08.	  	  	  	  	  
Our	  models	  are	  summarised	  in	  the	  following	  table.	  For	  instance,	  model	  1	  formulates	  a	  debt	  channel	  
through	  the	  order:	  public	  social	  spending	  –	  disposable	  personal	  income	  –	  household	  financial	  
obligations.	  	  
Table	  1:	  SVAR	  model	  specifications	  
	   Public	  social	  spending	  
Disposable	  personal	  income	  
Private	  social	  spending	  
Disposable	  personal	  income	  
Debt	  channel	   1. household	  financial	  obligations	   2. household	  financial	  obligations	  
Leverage	  channel	   3. household	  financial	  obligations	  -­‐	  
real	  estate	  assets	  of	  households	  
4. household	  financial	  obligations	  -­‐	  
real	  estate	  assets	  of	  households	  
Asset	  channels	   5. pension	  fund	  assets	  of	  households	   6. pension	  fund	  assets	  of	  households	  
	   7. real	  estate	  assets	  of	  households	   8. real	  estate	  assets	  of	  households	  
	   9. firm	  equity	  held	  by	  households	   10. firm	  equity	  held	  by	  households	  
	  
All	  variables	  (except	  for	  household	  financial	  obligations)	  are	  expressed	  in	  their	  annual	  log	  levels.	  
Household	  financial	  obligations	  are	  expressed	  as	  a	  share	  of	  GDP,	  and	  thus	  were	  kept	  as	  percentages.	  
The	  sample	  stretches	  from	  1980	  to	  2010.	  The	  shocks	  are	  identified	  using	  the	  standard	  Cholesky	  
decomposition	  method,	  and	  are	  normalized.	  We	  can	  also	  infer	  the	  qualitative	  direction	  of	  this	  effect,	  
namely	  whether	  the	  impulse	  response	  of	  the	  household	  finance	  variable	  to	  a	  1%	  increase	  in	  the	  
social	  spending	  variable	  is	  negative	  or	  positive,	  thus	  revealing	  a	  substitutive	  or	  complementary	  
relationship,	  respectively.	  The	  relationship	  may	  even	  change	  over	  the	  10	  periods	  following	  the	  
introduction	  of	  the	  shock.	  The	  variance	  decomposition	  looks	  at	  how	  much	  of	  the	  variance	  of	  a	  
variable	  (eg	  a	  household	  finance	  variable	  like	  pension	  assets)	  is	  driven	  or	  explained	  by	  the	  variance	  
of	  the	  other	  variables	  in	  the	  model	  (we	  are	  particularly	  interested	  in	  public	  and	  private	  social	  
spending).	  Our	  time	  horizon	  of	  10	  periods	  means	  over	  ten	  years	  as	  we	  use	  annual	  data.	  Based	  on	  the	  
results	  from	  standard	  lag	  tests,	  we	  choose	  2	  lags	  for	  our	  specifications,	  ie	  a	  change	  in	  social	  spending	  
in	  1990	  would	  show	  a	  change	  in	  household	  finances	  in	  1992	  at	  the	  earliest.	  
	  
A.	  	  Structural	  change	  in	  the	  relations	  between	  social	  spending	  and	  household	  finance	  
The	  identification	  of	  a	  structural	  break	  is	  based	  on	  how	  strongly	  both	  the	  impulse	  response	  functions	  
and	  variance	  decompositions	  differ.	  If	  we	  find	  that	  the	  impulse	  responses	  and	  the	  contribution	  of	  
shocks	  jointly	  differ	  considerably	  from	  one	  period	  to	  another,	  we	  interpret	  this	  as	  a	  significant	  
alteration	  in	  the	  structural	  relation	  between	  the	  model	  variables,	  and	  thus	  a	  structural	  break.	  This	  is	  
very	  similar	  to	  a	  traditional	  subsampling	  estimation	  strategy.	  We	  acknowledge	  that	  this	  is	  not	  a	  
formal	  way	  of	  checking	  for	  structural	  breaks,	  but	  due	  to	  the	  limited	  number	  of	  observables	  in	  our	  
sample,	  we	  found	  this	  method	  to	  be	  the	  most	  convincing	  when	  balancing	  statistical	  rigour	  with	  
limited	  data	  samples.6	  
The	  first	  significant	  observation	  to	  note	  is	  that	  we	  find	  a	  structural	  change	  (break)	  in	  relations	  for	  
most	  models	  between	  the	  years	  1995	  and	  ’97	  and	  for	  all	  in	  just	  five	  years	  in	  the	  mid-­‐to-­‐late	  1990s	  
(table	  2).	  Moreover,	  we	  find	  that	  the	  structural	  change	  in	  the	  specifications	  with	  public	  social	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  There	  are	  other	  methods	  to	  identify	  the	  shocks,	  such	  as	  the	  zero	  restrictions,	  or	  the	  sign	  restrictions.	  However,	  since	  
there	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  a	  strong	  theory	  to	  guide	  the	  imposition	  of	  restrictions	  in	  this	  literature,	  there	  is	  a	  high	  risk	  of	  
misspecification,	  and	  thus	  misinterpretation	  of	  results.	  We	  therefore	  opt	  for	  an	  agnostic	  and	  empirically	  driven	  approach.	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spending	  occur	  1	  to	  3	  years	  prior	  to	  the	  counterparts	  with	  private	  social	  spending,	  except	  for	  the	  
debt	  channel	  model	  where	  the	  break	  occurs	  earlier	  for	  private	  social	  spending.	  That	  is,	  the	  break	  in	  
model	  2	  occurs	  a	  year	  before	  the	  break	  in	  model	  1.	  This	  is	  a	  potentially	  interesting	  finding	  to	  which	  
we	  come	  back	  below,	  once	  we	  also	  know	  whether	  the	  effects	  of	  public	  and	  private	  social	  spending	  
have	  the	  ‘right’	  signs.	  
	  
Table	  2:	  Structural	  changes	  in	  the	  model	  specifications	  1-­‐10	  
Year	  of	  break	   Specification	  
1994	   5	  
1995	   7,	  3	  
1996	   2,	  9	  
1997	   1,	  6,	  10,	  4	  
1998	   8	  	  
	   	  
Notes:	  Red	  –	  debt	  channel;	  brown	  –	  leverage	  channel	  ;	  blue	  –	  models	  of	  an	  asset	  channel;	  uneven	  numbers	  order	  public	  social	  spending	  
first,	  even	  order	  private	  first.	  
The	  following	  sections	  compare	  pairs	  of	  model	  specifications	  that	  have	  public	  and	  private	  social	  
expenditure	  as	  the	  determining	  variable	  by	  ordering	  them	  first	  in	  the	  specifications	  (model	  1	  with	  2,	  
model	  3	  with	  4	  and	  so	  on).	  This	  is	  to	  see	  whether	  they	  have	  opposite	  effects	  on	  the	  specific	  
household	  finance	  variable	  (debt,	  pension	  assets	  etc).	  We	  evaluate	  the	  effects	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  
impulse	  responses	  and	  the	  variance	  decompositions	  before	  and	  after	  each	  break.	  Finally,	  we	  ask	  for	  
noticeable	  feedback	  effects	  from	  household	  finance	  variables	  on	  social	  expenditure.	  
	  
B.	  	  The	  debt	  channel	  of	  social	  spending	  on	  household	  finances	  
Models	  1	  and	  2	  look	  at	  how	  public	  and	  private	  social	  spending,	  respectively,	  affected	  household	  
financial	  obligations	  measured	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  disposable	  personal	  income.7	  A	  1%	  increase	  in	  
public	  spending	  (PS)	  leads	  to	  a	  strong	  fall	  in	  financial	  obligations	  of	  (–)0.4%	  before	  the	  break	  in	  1997,	  
and	  a	  weak	  positive,	  then	  negative	  response	  afterwards.	  PS	  explains	  a	  high	  share	  of	  the	  variance	  in	  
this	  household	  liabilities	  variable	  before	  and	  after	  the	  break.	  In	  model	  2,	  a	  1%	  increase	  in	  private	  
spending	  (PRS)	  has	  first	  a	  slightly	  positive	  (0.01%)	  and	  then	  strongly	  negative	  effect	  of	  (-­‐)0.7%	  by	  
year	  5	  on	  households	  financial	  obligations	  before	  the	  break.	  After	  1995,	  the	  effect	  of	  a	  rise	  in	  PRS	  is	  
strongly	  positive	  (0.3%	  in	  year	  3)	  and	  then	  falls	  off	  to	  become	  strongly	  negative	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  
the	  impulse	  response	  horizon.	  Between	  40%	  and	  60%	  of	  the	  variation	  in	  financial	  obligations	  is	  
explained	  by	  PRS.	  	  There	  is	  a	  weak	  feedback	  effect	  from	  household	  financial	  obligations	  to	  PRS,	  
positive	  before	  the	  break	  (turning	  negative	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  the	  horizon)	  and	  negative	  after	  the	  
break.	  	  
Thus,	  the	  two	  social	  spending	  variables	  seem	  to	  have	  a	  rather	  different	  effect	  on	  households’	  
obligation	  ratio:	  it	  is	  negative	  before	  the	  break	  and	  then	  weaker	  for	  PS	  after	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  while	  it	  is	  
significant	  and	  positive	  for	  PRS	  for	  the	  earlier	  horizons.	  This	  means	  that	  PRS	  seems	  to	  first	  incentivize	  
additional	  obligations	  and	  later	  to	  force	  households	  into	  savings.	  These	  results	  lends	  some	  but	  not	  
overwhelming	  support	  to	  a	  debt	  channel	  	  that	  was	  triggered	  by	  welfare	  state	  changes	  in	  the	  1990s.	  
Model	  1	  -­‐	  Public	  Social	  Spending	  (PS),	  Disposable	  Personal	  Income	  (DISPINC),	  Household	  Financial	  
Obligations	  (HSHLDFINOBL)	  
Sample	  (1982-­‐1997)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  This	  is	  a	  broad	  measure	  of	  household	  liabilities	  that	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  Bank	  introduced	  in	  2003	  only	  (Dynan	  et	  al	  2003).	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End	  of	  model	  1	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End	  of	  model	  2	  	  
We	  also	  experimented	  with	  another	  variable	  for	  household	  debt	  (see	  appendix	  for	  details)	  and	  the	  
two	  debt	  channel	  models	  concur	  in	  that	  PS	  has	  the	  expected	  negative	  effect	  on	  households’	  
liabilities,	  although	  with	  some	  delay	  after	  the	  break.	  It	  also	  shows	  a	  much	  weaker	  causal	  role	  for	  PS	  
after	  the	  break	  in	  the	  1990s.	  The	  weaker	  post-­‐break	  role	  coincides	  with	  a	  somewhat	  weaker	  
explanatory	  power	  for	  the	  variance.	  PRS	  incentivizes	  households	  to	  take	  on	  more	  liabilities	  and,	  as	  in	  
model	  2,	  causes	  them	  later	  to	  reduce	  their	  liabilities,	  in	  other	  words	  to	  save.	  In	  sum,	  it	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  
robust	  finding	  that	  welfare	  state	  retrenchment	  did	  not	  immediately	  push	  households	  into	  debt	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expansion	  of	  tax	  subsidies	  for	  private	  welfare	  provisions	  sustained	  ever	  higher	  levels	  of	  household	  
indebtedness	  but	  had	  a	  teendency	  to	  reverse	  its	  earlier	  positive	  impulse	  on	  household	  liabilities.	  	  
C.	  	  The	  leverage	  channel	  of	  social	  spending	  on	  household	  finances	  
The	  changes	  in	  welfare	  states	  may	  of	  course	  had	  a	  role	  in	  what	  observers	  saw	  as	  the	  immediate	  
shocking	  revelation	  of	  the	  (subprime)	  crisis,	  namely	  that	  something	  had	  incentivised	  households	  to	  
leverage	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  real	  estate	  collateral.	  A	  house	  price	  bubble	  could	  thus	  feed	  on	  itself	  because	  
rising	  credit	  raised	  prices	  for	  real	  estate	  which	  thus	  became	  more	  valuable	  as	  collateral	  (Justiniano	  et	  
al	  2013).	  	  
Models	  3	  and	  4	  test	  this	  leverage	  channel	  by	  ordering	  PS	  and	  PRS	  first,	  with	  disposable	  income	  as	  
the	  intermediate	  variable,	  and	  financial	  obligations	  and	  real	  estate	  assets	  last.	  We	  find	  that	  a	  1%	  rise	  
in	  PS	  leads	  to	  a	  fall	  of	  financial	  obligations	  and	  real	  estate	  before	  the	  break	  but	  to	  a	  weakly	  positive	  
response	  after	  the	  break.	  So	  retrenchment	  of	  public	  welfare	  as	  such	  leads	  to	  a	  decline	  in	  household	  
indebtedness	  and	  homeownership	  after	  the	  break.	  The	  explanatory	  power	  for	  the	  variance	  of	  either	  
indicator	  increases	  on	  average	  after	  the	  break.	  In	  stark	  contrast	  is	  the	  response	  of	  financial	  
obligations	  to	  PRS,	  that	  first	  rises	  to	  a	  sizeable	  0.4%	  and	  then	  falls	  to	  (-­‐)0.4%	  in	  year	  7	  before	  the	  
break,	  with	  a	  similar	  but	  weaker	  pattern	  for	  real	  estate.	  After	  the	  break	  in	  1996,	  the	  direction	  of	  
causation	  is	  the	  opposite:	  first	  negative	  on	  both	  (and	  again	  much	  stronger	  for	  financial	  obligations	  
than	  real	  estate)	  and	  then	  positive	  half-­‐way	  through	  the	  impulse	  response	  horizon.	  The	  share	  of	  PRS	  
in	  the	  explanation	  of	  variance	  of	  both	  variables	  reaches	  50%	  with	  some	  delay;	  after	  the	  break,	  this	  
contribution	  is	  slightly	  smaller,	  but	  nevertheless	  significant	  at	  around	  30-­‐40%.	  There	  is	  a	  slight	  
positive	  feedback	  effect	  of	  both	  financial	  obligations	  and	  real	  estate	  holdings	  over	  the	  first	  half	  of	  
the	  horizon	  on	  PRS	  only.	  
The	  evidence	  for	  leverage	  effect	  is	  therefore	  not	  overwhelming	  as	  far	  as	  the	  social	  spending	  
variables	  are	  concerned:	  PS	  has	  a	  weakly	  positive	  effect	  on	  financial	  obligations	  and	  real	  estate	  
assets	  after	  the	  break	  and	  PRS	  reverses	  its	  (‘corect’)	  positive	  effect	  half-­‐way	  through	  the	  horzon	  of	  
10	  years.	  If	  we	  look	  at	  effects	  between	  financial	  obligations	  and	  real	  estates	  in	  their	  respective	  
impulse	  responses	  more	  directly,	  we	  do	  not	  find	  them	  to	  be	  strong	  in	  model	  3	  with	  PS	  ordered	  first.	  
This	  is	  in	  contrast	  to	  model	  4	  after	  the	  break	  in	  1995.	  Here,	  the	  effect	  of	  real	  estate	  on	  household	  
financial	  obligations	  is	  much	  stronger,	  worth	  0.2%,	  than	  that	  of	  financial	  obligations	  on	  real	  estate	  
with	  0.02%.	  This	  is	  some	  support	  for	  a	  leverage	  effect	  of	  PRS	  after	  the	  break.	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Model	  3	  -­‐	  Public	  Social	  Spending	  (PS),	  Disposable	  Personal	  Income	  (DISPINC),	  Household	  Financial	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End	  of	  model	  3	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Model	  4	  -­‐	  Private	  Social	  Spending	  (PRS),	  Disposable	  Personal	  Income	  (DISPINC),	  Household	  Financial	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End	  of	  model	  4	  
Again,	  we	  experimented	  with	  another	  variable	  for	  household	  liabilities	  (see	  Appendix	  for	  details).	  
The	  findings	  from	  these	  models	  for	  a	  leverage	  channel	  were	  consistent	  with	  the	  results	  of	  model	  3,	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household	  leveraging,	  ie	  increasing	  their	  indebtedness	  based	  on	  the	  real	  estate	  collateral	  they	  
acquire	  with	  credit.	  The	  findings	  on	  PRS,	  however,	  are	  not	  entirely	  consistent	  with	  model	  4,	  hence	  
the	  qualified	  evidence	  for	  a	  leverage	  effect	  we	  found	  in	  model	  4	  is	  not	  robust	  and	  seems	  to	  differ	  
with	  the	  indicator	  used.	  
D.	  	  The	  asset	  channel	  of	  social	  spending	  on	  household	  finances	  
We	  explore	  three	  pairs	  of	  models	  on	  the	  asset	  channel	  that	  differ	  according	  to	  the	  types	  of	  assets	  in	  
each	  specification.	  We	  wish	  to	  test	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  welfare	  state	  transformations	  (retrenchment	  
of	  public	  spending	  and	  expansion	  of	  the	  hidden	  welfare	  state)	  has	  given	  a	  boost	  to	  private	  finance	  by	  
forcing	  households	  to	  save	  and	  seek	  commercial	  substitutes.	  Models	  5	  and	  6	  have	  pension	  
entitlements	  (assets)	  as	  the	  household	  finance	  variable	  that	  is	  determined	  by	  public	  and	  private	  
social	  spending,	  the	  latter	  for	  instance	  through	  tax	  subsidies	  for	  occupational	  and	  personal	  pensions.	  	  
We	  find	  in	  model	  5	  that	  a	  1%	  increase	  in	  PS	  leads	  to	  a	  small	  fall	  in	  pension	  assets	  of	  (-­‐)0.02%	  before	  
the	  break	  in	  1993	  while	  after	  the	  break	  the	  fall	  is	  initially	  stronger	  (-­‐0.08%)	  but	  shows	  no	  consistent	  
effect	  after	  year	  3.	  While	  the	  share	  of	  PS	  explaining	  the	  volatility	  in	  pension	  assets	  increases	  from	  0	  
to	  40%	  over	  time,	  the	  share	  decreases	  from	  40%	  to	  20%	  after	  the	  break.	  The	  effect	  of	  a	  rise	  in	  PRS	  is	  
initially	  very	  weak	  and	  turns,	  counterintuitively,	  negative	  in	  year	  3	  before	  the	  break.	  	  After	  1997,	  a	  
rise	  in	  PRS	  has	  the	  expected	  positive	  effect	  on	  pension	  asset	  formation	  of	  households,	  of	  0.07%	  
initially,	  then	  falling	  to	  0	  and	  rising	  again	  to	  0.04%.	  PRS	  explains	  less	  than	  20%	  of	  the	  variation	  in	  
pension	  assets	  before	  the	  break	  in	  1996	  but	  between	  20%	  and	  40%	  afterwards.	  The	  feedback	  effects	  
of	  an	  impulse	  from	  pension	  assets	  on	  PS	  are	  negative	  before	  the	  break	  and	  unstable	  afterwards	  
while	  there	  is	  hardly	  any	  feedback	  on	  PRS.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  increasing	  relevance	  of	  PRS	  mirrors	  
the	  decreasing	  relevance	  of	  PS,	  and	  they	  both	  have	  the	  expected	  sign	  after	  the	  break.	  This	  lends	  
support	  to	  the	  asset	  channel	  of	  social	  spending	  on	  pensions	  while	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  of	  reverse	  
causation,	  ie	  that	  changes	  in	  pension	  finance	  caused	  the	  welfare	  state	  to	  change.	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Model	  6	  -­‐	  Private	  Social	  Spending	  (PRS),	  Disposable	  Personal	  Income	  (DISPINC),	  Pension	  Funds	  held	  














































































End	  of	  model	  6	  
Models	  7	  and	  8	  look	  at	  the	  effect	  of	  changes	  in	  social	  spending	  on	  real	  estate	  assets,	  ie	  whether	  we	  
can	  discern	  a	  ‘nest-­‐egg-­‐effect’	  of	  rising	  homeownership	  in	  response	  to	  welfare	  state	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holdings	  after	  the	  break.	  We	  find	  that	  before	  1995	  a	  1%	  rise	  in	  PS	  leads	  to	  a	  weak	  but	  sustained	  fall	  
of	  (-­‐)0.02%	  of	  real	  estate	  held	  by	  households	  and	  afterwards	  a	  slowly	  rising	  positive	  effect	  of	  0.1%	  in	  
year	  5,	  turning	  strongly	  negative	  afterwards	  (-­‐0.4%	  in	  year	  8).	  This	  points	  to	  a	  delayed	  negative	  net	  
effect	  that	  we	  also	  found	  (more	  weakly)	  in	  model	  5	  with	  pensions.	  The	  explanatory	  power	  of	  PS	  for	  
the	  variance	  of	  the	  real	  estate	  time	  series	  is	  40%	  and	  rising	  steadily	  to	  80%	  before	  the	  break,	  which	  
after	  the	  break	  becomes	  weaker	  and	  fluctuating	  afterwards	  but	  is	  still	  high	  at	  60%	  on	  average.	  In	  
model	  8,	  a	  rise	  in	  PRS	  has	  a	  discernible	  and	  persistent	  positive	  effect	  on	  real	  estate	  holdings	  before	  
the	  break,	  reaching	  0.03%	  in	  year	  2,	  that	  is	  of	  similar	  size	  and	  direction	  after	  the	  break.	  The	  variance	  
decomposition	  shows	  that	  PRS	  explains	  between	  40	  and	  50%	  of	  the	  variance	  in	  real	  estate	  assets	  
before	  the	  break	  in	  1997,	  but	  decreases	  to	  between	  20%	  and	  40%	  afterwards.	  There	  is	  a	  small	  but	  
discernible	  feedback	  effect	  of	  real	  estate	  holdings	  on	  PRS	  which	  is	  positive	  over	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  
horizon,	  which	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  interpretation	  that	  rising	  homeownership	  may	  create	  a	  
constituency	  for,	  or	  change	  in	  preferences	  in	  favour	  of	  more	  privatised	  welfare	  provisions.	  Feedback	  
effects	  on	  PS	  are	  negligible.	  
It	  is	  thus	  noticeable	  that	  the	  PS	  variable	  supports	  a	  nest-­‐egg	  effect	  from	  retrenching	  public	  welfare	  
provisions	  although	  more	  strongly	  and	  clearly	  before	  the	  break.	  	  The	  findings	  on	  PRS	  are	  also	  
consistent	  with	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  hidden	  (subsidised	  private)	  welfare	  state	  has	  
fuelled	  increasing	  homeownership.	  	  
	  
Model	  	  7	  -­‐	  [Public	  Social	  Spending	  (PS),	  Disposable	  Personal	  Income	  (DISPINC),	  Real	  Estate	  Assets	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End	  of	  model	  7	  
Model	  8	  -­‐	  Private	  Social	  Spending	  (PRS),	  Disposable	  Personal	  Income	  (DISPINC),	  Real	  Estate	  Assets	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End	  of	  model	  8	  
Finally,	  in	  models	  9	  and	  10	  we	  look	  at	  a	  household	  finance	  variable	  that	  seems	  to	  be	  more	  remote	  
from	  the	  influence	  of	  welfare	  state	  transformations,	  namely	  households’	  ownership	  of	  corporate	  
equity.	  The	  distribution	  of	  these	  assets	  is	  skewed	  towards	  the	  upper	  income	  distribution	  and	  a	  
significant	  effect	  would	  bolster	  the	  financialization	  literature	  that	  sees	  both	  the	  changes	  in	  welfare	  
states	  and	  in	  household	  finances	  as	  part	  of	  larger	  secular	  shift	  towards	  the	  dominance	  of	  finance	  and	  
regressive	  commercialization.	  In	  model	  9,	  we	  find	  before	  the	  break	  that	  a	  1%	  rise	  in	  PS	  has	  a	  weak	  
short-­‐lived	  effect	  of	  0.04%	  on	  equity	  holdings	  (but	  falls	  to	  around	  0	  by	  year	  3);	  after	  1996,	  this	  
temporary	  effect	  is	  much	  stronger	  and	  negative	  at	  (-­‐)0.2%	  in	  year	  1	  (rising	  to	  0	  by	  year	  3).	  The	  
explanatory	  power	  of	  PS	  for	  the	  variance	  in	  equity	  holdings	  of	  20%	  before	  the	  break	  increases	  to	  
between	  30	  and	  40%	  afterwards.	  In	  model	  10,	  a	  weak	  negative	  response	  of	  equity	  holdings	  (-­‐0.08%)	  
to	  a	  1%	  rise	  in	  PRS	  before	  the	  break	  turned	  to	  a	  strong	  positive,	  albeit	  short-­‐lived	  response	  of	  almost	  
0.2%	  after	  1997.	  The	  explanatory	  power	  of	  PRS	  for	  the	  volatility	  in	  equities	  decreases	  however,	  from	  
around	  60%	  of	  the	  variance	  of	  equity	  holdings	  to	  around	  40%	  after	  the	  break	  in	  1996.	  There	  are	  no	  
feedback	  effects	  of	  equity	  holdings	  on	  PS	  and	  on	  PRS.	  
The	  findings	  on	  the	  two	  social	  spending	  variables	  lend	  some	  support	  to	  the	  hypothesis	  in	  the	  
financialization	  literature:	  first	  of	  all,	  that	  we	  find	  any	  relationship	  between	  social	  spending	  and	  
equity	  holdings	  is	  remarkable;	  second,	  the	  rising	  significance	  for	  and	  the	  expected	  sign	  of	  a	  change	  in	  
PS	  after	  the	  break	  indicates	  a	  regime	  shift;	  and	  last	  but	  not	  least,	  the	  strong	  positive	  impulse	  of	  PRS	  
after	  the	  break	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  view	  that	  welfare	  state	  transformations	  and	  the	  prominence	  of	  
financial	  markets	  for	  households	  are	  part	  of	  one	  big	  change.	  The	  only	  caveat	  is	  that	  the	  declining	  
explanatory	  power	  of	  PRS	  for	  equity	  holdings	  does	  not	  entirely	  fit	  this	  interpretation.	  	  	  



















































































































End	  of	  model	  9.	  



















































































































































End	  of	  model	  10	  
Our	  asset	  channel	  models	  have	  a	  fairly	  consistent	  message:	  our	  findings	  on	  models	  with	  PS	  suggest	  
that	  the	  retrenchment	  of	  public	  provisions	  has	  contributed	  to	  households	  seeking	  private	  
substitutes.	  In	  both	  pension	  entitlements	  and	  household	  real	  estate	  we	  find	  a	  delayed	  negative	  
effect	  supporting	  the	  asset	  channel.	  On	  equity	  holdings,	  we	  find	  that	  PS	  has	  an	  unexpected	  strong	  
negative	  effect.	  Even	  if	  short-­‐lived,	  this	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  financialization	  has	  led	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welfare	  state’,	  ie	  the	  incentivised	  expansion	  of	  PRS,	  contributed	  as	  expected	  to	  the	  expansion	  of	  
pension	  assets,	  real	  estate	  holdings	  and	  equity	  investments	  of	  households.	  	  
In	  sum,	  we	  consider	  our	  evidence	  on	  the	  asset	  channel	  to	  be	  strongest.	  The	  next	  section	  tries	  to	  link	  
the	  findings	  here	  to	  evidence	  about	  changes	  in	  the	  tax-­‐transfer	  system	  that	  could	  account	  for	  this	  
channel.	  
IV.	  	  Changes	  in	  the	  US	  tax	  and	  transfer	  system	  since	  the	  later	  1980s	  
Changes	  in	  the	  tax	  system	  and	  the	  ways	  how	  transfers	  were	  delivered	  ever	  have	  transformed	  the	  US	  
welfare	  state	  since	  the	  1970s.	  For	  the	  explanation	  of	  the	  structural	  break	  noted	  in	  sub-­‐section	  III.A,	  
we	  would	  look	  for	  reforms	  under	  the	  Bush	  senior	  government	  onwards	  and	  into	  the	  early	  years	  of	  
the	  Clinton	  administration.	  	  
First,	  the	  pension	  system	  was	  significantly	  reformed,	  but	  again,	  somewhat	  early	  for	  the	  break	  we	  
found	  above.	  The	  Revenue	  Act	  of	  1978	  introduced	  pension	  tax	  subsidies	  for	  occupational	  pension	  
plans,	  under	  Section	  401(k)	  of	  the	  US	  tax	  code.	  Further	  reforms	  in	  1981	  allowed	  employees	  to	  
borrow	  against	  their	  plans	  and	  receive	  their	  accumulated	  pension	  savings	  as	  a	  lump	  sum	  when	  they	  
left	  their	  job	  (Hacker	  2002:	  164-­‐165).	  This	  could	  explain	  a	  delayed	  effect	  because	  obviously	  it	  
requires	  some	  time	  to	  elapse	  before	  enough	  contributions	  have	  accumulated	  that	  can	  be	  used	  as	  
collateral	  for,	  say,	  a	  mortgage.	  Employers	  took	  up	  this	  opportunity	  for	  cutting	  their	  taxes	  much	  more	  
vigorously	  than	  anticipated.	  Subsequently,	  they	  also	  shifted	  from	  defined-­‐benefit	  (DB)	  to	  defined-­‐
contribution	  (DC)	  pension	  plans	  whereby	  employees	  were	  given	  broad	  latitude	  to	  determine	  the	  
amount	  and	  types	  of	  investments	  they	  would	  make,	  but	  bearing	  the	  risk	  of	  inadequate	  retirement	  
funds.	  While	  in	  1985	  35	  percent	  of	  workers	  were	  in	  DC	  plans,	  by	  1996	  the	  share	  of	  DC	  plans	  had	  
surpassed	  that	  of	  the	  DB	  plans.	  By	  2009,	  61	  percent	  of	  the	  aggregate	  pension	  funds	  were	  held	  in	  DC,	  
and	  only	  39	  percent	  in	  DB	  (Ryan	  et	  al,	  2011).	  	  
In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  the	  years	  following	  the	  1993	  tax	  increases	  lead	  to	  a	  further	  proliferation	  of	  tax	  
vehicles	  to	  promote	  purpose-­‐specific	  saving.	  For	  instance,	  an	  Education	  Individual	  Retirement	  
Account	  (IRA)	  and	  the	  Section	  529	  Qualified	  Tuition	  Program	  were	  created	  to	  help	  taxpayers	  pay	  for	  
future	  education	  expenses.	  Medical	  Savings	  Accounts	  were	  promoted	  to	  facilitate	  saving	  for	  medical	  
expenses.	  Roth	  IRA	  was	  also	  enacted,	  providing	  a	  new	  form	  of	  retirement	  savings	  by	  allowing	  
contributions	  to	  be	  made	  in	  after-­‐tax	  dollars	  	  (unlike	  the	  traditional	  IRA	  and	  employer-­‐based	  401(k)	  
plans)	  and	  tax-­‐free	  distributions	  (US	  Department	  of	  the	  Treasury,	  2003).	  What	  is	  relevant	  for	  our	  
context	  is	  that	  these	  vehicles	  could	  explain	  the	  dominance	  of	  an	  asset	  channel	  over	  a	  debt	  channel:	  
households	  were	  incentivized	  to	  first	  save	  and	  then	  take	  on	  debt	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  down-­‐payment.	  	  	  
The	  changes	  in	  taxation	  that	  took	  place	  in	  the	  early	  years	  of	  the	  Clinton	  administration	  are	  complex8	  
and	  cannot	  entirely	  be	  reconciled	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  structural	  break.	  Marginal	  tax	  rates	  on	  incomes	  
were	  increased	  in	  both	  the	  1990	  and	  the	  1993	  budgets,	  reinstating	  the	  tax	  progressivity	  that	  was	  
abolished	  under	  Republican	  administrations.	  Top	  tax	  rates	  increased	  from	  28%	  in	  1989	  to	  almost	  
40%	  in	  1993;	  Medicare	  contributions	  also	  increased	  significantly	  for	  high-­‐income	  earners.	  Capital	  
gains	  taxes,	  by	  contrast,	  were	  significantly	  reduced	  in	  the	  1997	  bill.	  This	  is	  somewhat	  too	  late	  for	  our	  
findings	  of	  an	  asset	  channel	  that	  works	  through	  corporate	  equity	  held	  by	  households.	  	  
V.	  	  Conclusion	  
Our	  paper	  contributes	  to	  an	  increasing	  literature	  that	  tries	  to	  explain	  what	  caused	  the	  surge	  in	  
household	  finance	  that	  ended	  in	  the	  Great	  Recession	  since	  2008.	  We	  draw	  attention	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  
ill-­‐conceived	  social	  policy	  changes,	  notably	  retrenchment	  of	  public	  provisions	  and	  expansion	  of	  tax	  
subsidies	  for	  private	  provision,	  stimulated	  households	  to	  take	  recourse	  to	  financial	  products.	  A	  first	  





finding	  is	  that	  there	  is	  a	  structural	  break	  in	  the	  relationship	  between	  social	  spending	  and	  various	  
household	  finance	  variables	  in	  the	  mid	  1990s.	  
We	  established	  that	  private	  social	  spending	  has	  the	  expected	  effect	  of	  stimulating	  household	  
finance.	  We	  also	  find	  that	  it	  is	  not	  so	  much	  that	  either	  public	  retrenchment	  or	  the	  hidden	  welfare	  
state	  of	  tax	  expenditures	  pushes	  households	  directly	  into	  debt	  or	  leveraging	  up	  on	  their	  homes.	  
Rather,	  it	  works	  through	  an	  asset	  channel,	  ie	  the	  changes	  in	  social	  spending	  seem	  to	  cause	  an	  
expansion	  of	  pension	  assets,	  real	  estate	  and	  even	  corporate	  equity	  held	  by	  households.	  
We	  tried	  to	  relate	  these	  findings	  to	  changes	  in	  the	  tax-­‐transfer	  system	  since	  the	  mid-­‐1980s	  until	  the	  
early	  years	  of	  the	  Clinton	  administration.	  While	  some	  connections	  can	  be	  drawn,	  we	  cannot	  claim	  
what	  really	  can	  be	  made	  responsible	  for	  the	  structural	  change.	  More	  research	  is	  needed.	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A1.	  	  Description	  of	  the	  data	  
Variable	  name	   Description	   Sample	  period	   Source	  
Disposable	  Income	   Disposable	  Personal	  Income	   1950-­‐2010	   Federal	  Reserve	  St	  Louis	  
database	  
Equities	   Corporate	  equities	  –Assets-­‐
Households	  





Obligations	  as	  a	  percent	  of	  
Disposable	  Personal	  Income	  
1980-­‐2010	   Federal	  Reserve	  St	  Louis	  
database	  
Pension	  Funds	   Pension	  Fund	  Reserves	  –	  
Assets	  -­‐	  Households	  
1952-­‐2010	   Federal	  Reserve	  St	  Louis	  
database	  
Private	  Social	  Spending	   Private	  Social	  Spending	  in	  
terms	  of	  2000	  prices	  
1980-­‐2010	   OECD	  Social	  Expenditure	  
Database	  
Public	  Social	  Spending	   Public	  Social	  Spending	  at	  
constant	  2000	  prices	  
1980-­‐2010	   OECD	  Social	  Expenditure	  
Database	  
Real	  Estate	  Assets	   Real	  Estate	  –	  Assets-­‐	  
Households	  
1952-­‐2010	   Federal	  Reserve	  St	  Louis	  
database	  
	   	   	   	  
	  
The	  data	  is	  expressed	  in	  annual	  terms.	  Natural	  logarithms	  were	  applied	  to	  the	  data	  (except	  for	  
household	  financial	  obligations)	  before	  they	  were	  used	  in	  the	  estimations.	  The	  main	  summary	  
statistics	  follow	  below:	  
Variable	  name	   Minimum	   Maximum	   Mean	   Stnd.	  dev	   Median	  
Disposable	  Income	   7.57	   9.30	   8.56	   0.52	   8.59	  
Equities	   6.56	   9.23	   8.09	   0.85	   8.17	  
Household	  Financial	  
Obligations	  
15.45	   18.76	   17.14	   0.93	   17.18	  
Pension	  Funds	   6.71	   9.47	   8.42	   0.84	   8.54	  
Private	  Social	  
Spending	  
7.06	   8.44	   7.91	   0.42	   7.94	  
Public	  Social	  
Spending	  
8.12	   9.03	   8.54	   0.27	   8.56	  
Real	  Estate	  Assets	   8.05	   10.12	   9.14	   0.61	   9.06	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
A2.	  	  Robustness	  analysis	  
For	  robustness	  purposes,	  we	  estimated	  a	  set	  of	  specifications	  to	  check	  whether	  the	  results	  obtained	  
in	  section	  III	  are	  consistent.	  More	  specifically,	  we	  calculated	  the	  confidence	  intervals,	  estimated	  the	  
specifications	  in	  first	  differences,	  and	  checked	  whether	  the	  results	  alter	  significantly	  when	  we	  use	  
other	  proxies	  for	  household	  indebtedness	  and	  asset	  variables.	  
Confidence	  Intervals	  
In	  first	  instance,	  we	  calculated	  the	  confidence	  intervals	  for	  our	  results	  in	  models	  1-­‐10	  above.	  The	  
intervals	  are	  based	  on	  the	  2	  standard	  error	  band	  of	  the	  (median)	  impulse	  response.	  The	  IR	  horizons	  
are	  expressed	  in	  annual	  terms.	  We	  only	  report	  the	  confidence	  intervals	  for	  the	  variables	  of	  interest	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in	  the	  models,	  the	  household	  finance	  and	  social	  spending	  variables.	  The	  confidence	  intervals	  for	  the	  
other	  variables	  are	  available	  upon	  request.	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SVAR	  in	  first	  differences	  
Next	  we	  wanted	  to	  check	  whether	  trends	  in	  the	  data	  were	  driving	  the	  results	  of	  the	  VAR	  coefficients.	  
In	  particular,	  we	  were	  suspecting	  that	  the	  household	  asset	  variables,	  as	  well	  as	  private	  social	  
spending	  might	  be	  an	  I(1)	  process.	  Indeed,	  following	  the	  unit	  root	  tests	  for	  our	  variables,	  we	  found	  
that	  all	  variables,	  except	  household	  financial	  obligations	  were	  a	  I(1)	  process.	  Therefore,	  we	  re-­‐
estimated	  all	  the	  specification	  in	  first	  differences.	  Our	  new	  sample	  stretched	  from	  1983-­‐2010	  
(including	  any	  possible	  break	  within	  the	  sample).	  
Overall	  our	  (qualitative	  and	  quantitative)	  results	  do	  not	  change	  when	  we	  run	  the	  model	  in	  first-­‐
differences,	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  impulse	  responses	  and	  variance	  decomposition.	  	  The	  only	  exceptions	  
are:	  models	  2,	  4	  and	  6	  before	  the	  break,	  and	  8	  and	  10	  after	  the	  break,	  where	  the	  impulse	  responses	  
are	  qualitatively	  the	  same,	  but	  have	  higher	  magnitudes.	  Not	  only	  does	  this	  confirm	  our	  previous	  
findings,	  but	  it	  also	  makes	  our	  results	  on	  private	  social	  spending	  even	  more	  appealing	  and	  re-­‐
assuring.	  
Alternative	  specifications	  for	  household	  finances	  
Lastly,	  we	  wanted	  to	  test	  whether	  our	  findings	  change	  when	  we	  use	  alternative	  definitions	  of	  
household	  debt	  and	  assets.	  In	  particular,	  we	  wanted	  to	  see	  what	  the	  outcomes	  on	  the	  debt	  and	  
leverage	  channels	  (models	  1-­‐4)	  are	  when	  we	  first	  use	  a	  more	  standard	  and	  narrower	  definition	  of	  
household	  debt	  (instead	  of	  household	  financial	  obligations),	  and	  second	  when	  we	  use	  pension	  funds	  
and	  equity	  (instead	  of	  real	  estate	  assets)	  in	  the	  leverage	  specifications.	  	  
Starting	  with	  the	  debt	  and	  leverage	  specifications,	  where	  household	  debt	  was	  included	  instead	  of	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impact	  on	  households’	  liabilities	  in	  both	  cases,	  although	  with	  some	  delay	  after	  the	  break	  for	  the	  
alternative	  specification.	  Also	  in	  both	  cases,	  PS	  explains	  less	  of	  the	  variation	  in	  household	  liabilities	  
after	  the	  break.	  For	  PRS,	  the	  only	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  specifications	  is	  that	  the	  incentive	  to	  
reduce	  liabilities	  comes	  slightly	  later	  in	  the	  specification	  with	  household	  debt	  (horizon	  6)	  compared	  
to	  the	  specification	  with	  financial	  obligations	  (horizon	  2).9	  Also,	  the	  contribution	  of	  public	  spending	  
in	  explaining	  the	  volatility	  of	  household	  debt	  after	  the	  break	  is	  lower	  than	  for	  household	  financial	  
obligations	  (10-­‐20%	  versus	  80%).	  The	  opposite	  is	  true	  for	  private	  social	  spending,	  but	  again	  only	  
before	  the	  break	  (60%	  versus	  40%).	  	  
Lastly,	  we	  wanted	  to	  check	  whether	  the	  results	  obtained	  for	  models	  3	  and	  4	  were	  significantly	  
different	  when	  we	  exchanged	  real	  estate	  assets	  for	  pension	  fund	  assets	  as	  collateral	  (ordered	  last	  in	  
the	  models).	  In	  sum,	  the	  impulse	  responses	  of	  the	  debt	  measures	  (both	  household	  debt	  and	  
household	  financial	  obligations)	  to	  a	  shock	  in	  (public	  or	  private)	  social	  spending	  do	  not	  change	  
significantly	  to	  the	  benchmark	  case	  above.	  Moreover,	  the	  contribution	  of	  private	  welfare	  spending	  in	  
explaining	  the	  volatilities	  of	  the	  debt	  measures	  is	  very	  similar	  to	  the	  benchmark	  case	  (30-­‐70%).	  For	  
the	  public	  welfare	  spending,	  it	  is	  nevertheless	  lower	  after	  the	  break	  compared	  to	  the	  benchmark	  
case	  with	  real	  estate	  assets	  included	  in	  the	  model	  (10-­‐20%	  versus	  80%).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  impulse	  response	  of	  household	  debt	  to	  a	  normalized	  shock	  in	  private	  social	  spending	  turns	  negative	  in	  
horizon	  6,	  compared	  to	  horizon	  2	  for	  financial	  obligations.	  	  
